Quoting the Crisis

21/11/2009

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Only a short while ago, we were teetering on the brink of global financial collapse. Essentially, what occurred was a crisis of unintended consequences: Misperceptions of risk and misplaced incentives led to misguided actions. The crisis metastasized in large financial institutions and spread through the entire body of the financial system. Both on and off balance sheets, banks levered up to cancerous levels and funneled funds into assets of questionable quality.

These bad bets were made worse by their scale and the rapidity with which they spread. It was not enough that one or two large institutions erroneously thought that real estate prices would rise forever—nearly all of the biggest banks did. It was not enough that one or two large institutions thought they could contract with third parties they presumed would immunize them against failure—nearly all did. And it was not enough that one or two regulators turned a blind eye to the systemic risk posed by this behavior—nearly all did, including the Federal Reserve.

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Paradise Lost: Addressing ‘Too Big to Fail’ (With Reference to John Milton and Irving Kristol) - Richard Fisher Speeches, 11-19-09 - News & Events - FRB Dallas

“ This vividly shows the risk of entering into interest- rate swap agreements. The world’s got to see what stupidity even the sophisticated investors like the transportation fund can get into. „

Christopher Taylor, former executive director of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board in Alexandria, Virginia, quoted by Dunstan McNichol in Goldman Sachs Still Paid for Swaps on Redeemed Bonds (Update2) - Bloomberg.com

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So, maybe Blankfein is sorry that his company is so good at wrapping up garbage and selling it as a birthday present.

Or, maybe he’s sorry he didn’t tell everyone (or even the company’s clients) that while Goldman Sachs was selling $40 billion in securities backed by housing junk, the company secretly made a bet against the housing market. When the housing market started to collapse, Goldman Sachs’ profits soared. The company managed to avoid a total meltdown with good timing and excellent salesmanship.

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Ilyce Glink in Goldman Sachs Says Sorry For The Housing and Credit Crisis - CBS MoneyWatch.com

“ We participated in things that were clearly wrong and have reason to regret. We apologize. „

Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs, quoted by Simon Kennedy in Goldman apologizes, offers small businesses help - MarketWatch

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What the good Professor is suggesting is that the Treasury doesn’t have to issue bonds at all. In fact, since the Treasury does control the electronic printing press, it could legitimately buy stuff with money it prints out of thin air. Sounds a bit like counterfeiting, doesn’t it?

But, let’s step back for a second: what is the functional difference for the federal government between Treasury securities and bank notes? Both are liabilities of the federal government. But liabilities of what? The only obligation they enforce on the government is the promise to repay with more paper (or electronic bank credits, if you will). For all intents and purposes, bank notes, reserve deposits, and Treasury securities are fungible: they are obligations to be repaid in the same fiat currency.

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Edward Harrison in If the U.S. stopped issuing treasuries, would it go broke? - Credit Writedowns

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While seeking concessions from the various banks, the Fed contacted the Commission Bancaire, a French regulator, to request support in its negotiations with two French institutions, Société Générale and Calyon.

The Commission Bancaire responded “forcibly” that unless A.I.G. were in bankruptcy, the French banks were “precluded by law from making concessions and could face potential criminal liability” if they helped.

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Mark Williams Walsh in Audit Faults New York Fed in A.I.G. Bailout - NYTimes.com

20/11/2009

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Just two days before the New York Fed paid A.I.G.’s partners 100 cents on the dollar to tear up their contracts with the insurance giant, one bank volunteered to take a modest haircut — but it never got the chance.

UBS, of Switzerland, alone offered to give a break to the New York Fed in the negotiations last November over how to keep A.I.G. from toppling and taking other banks down with it. It would have accepted 98 cents on the dollar.

But UBS’s good-faith gesture was quickly drowned out by Goldman Sachs and the top French bank regulator. They argued, with others, that it would be improper and perhaps even criminal to force A.I.G.’s trading partners to bear losses outside of bankruptcy court.

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Mark Williams Walsh in Audit Faults New York Fed in A.I.G. Bailout - NYTimes.com

“ The United States of America … came into this crisis without anything like the basic tools countries need to contain financial panics. Coming into AIG, we had basically duct tape and string. „

Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, quoted by Sarah O’Connor and Alan Rappeport in FT.com / US / Economy & Fed - Geithner defends record to Congress

19/11/2009

18/11/2009

“ I’m scared and leaders should look out. America is doing exactly what Japan did last time We have a U.S. dollar carry trade at the moment. Where is the money going — it’s where the problem’s going to be: Asia. You can see asset prices going up, not only in Korea, in Taiwan, in Singapore and in Hong Kong, going up to levels that are incompatible or inconsistent with the economic fundamentals. „

Donald Tsang, chief executive of the city of Singapore, quoted by Christopher Anstey and Michael Dwyer in Fed May Cause Next Crisis, Hong Kong’s Tsang Suggests (Update2) - Bloomberg.com

“ Finally, Mr. Dimon’s statement that the problem of interconnectedness of finiancial institutions is best handled by a resolution authority would be funny if it weren’t so dangerous and disingenuous. How can a resolution authority cure the interconnectedness problems of a failed institution that has billions of dollars of unhedged and unbacked credit default swaps or other derivatives outstanding? Interconnectedness problems must be identified and addressed before an institution fails. They can best be identified and measured if the underlying transactions that give rise to interconnectedness are known and understood by markets and regulators before the institution fails. The best means for accomplishing this is by establishing transparent clearing mechanisms and disclosure regimes. The banking industry is currently spending millions of dollars on lobbyists in an attempt to weaken such measures. „

James Coffman in Note to Jamie Dimon: Repeating Something Doesn’t Make It True « The Baseline Scenario

“ The latest Goldman predatory practice is using contractual details (the deal equivalent of “gotchas” in credit card agreements) to undermine the well understood premise underlying ALL structured credits, namely, that bottom tranches take losses first. With two Abacus deals (and since these are Goldman programs, one has to assume it very knowingly planted these trap doors), Goldman is favoring the junior investors over the seniors. „

Yves Smith in Goldman Gives Preferential Treatment to Junior CDO Holders Over Senior « naked capitalism

17/11/2009

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The authorities are completely responsible for the messes on two different fronts that intersect to create monetary policy dilemma. Going below 2% for Fed funds was a huge error (well maybe you could justify 1% as a very short term expedient), but the Fed is now painted in a corner. But second, and the much bigger issue, is that (as everyone can see) all this cheap money is not going into the real economy. A few very high quality borrowers are getting good rates; everyone else finds credit scarce and costly. So spreads are higher than before, and even absolute rates are often higher expect in markets like mortgages where the Fed has intervened.

Now some readers will correctly say that overly loose lending is what created the problem, and we need to undo that, but they are conflating two issues. Tightening up on WHO gets credit and HOW MUCH they get is separate from pricing. If this was mere improved standards, you’d expect to see more discrimination within various types of borrowers. But instead, across entire swathes of borrowers, particularly consumers and small businesses, banks have simply turned off the spigot. This has little to do with a return to prudent practices. In fact, it illustrates a real cancer: that across consumers and many small business owners, old-fashioned multi-variable decision-making (which included some verification of income) has been replaced by heavily or entirely FICO based systems. Those systems failed utterly. But they were cheap to operate, banks have no intention of reverting to earlier, more costly approaches. So we have a credit assessment process that is broken, but no one wants to admit it.

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Yves Smith in China Lambastes Dollar “Carry Trade,” Diverting Attention from Its Currency Manipulation « naked capitalism

“ As lobbying attempts to eliminate or at least delay the implementation of FAS 166 and FAS 167 (as a reminder, these are the accounting rules that will force banks to onboard a lot of off-balance sheet assets) seem to have stalled, the next question becomes what the cost to banks will be as a result of this new change starting January 1. A research piece from Barclays attempts to do just that, and while presenting slightly improved results versus previous estimates, still provides a glimpse into why it has been so critical to pump up the stock prices of some of the most “at risk” financial companies. In a nutshell - the pain for the banks will be significant, to the tune of half a trillion dollars, with the usual suspects expected to take the bulk of the hit: Citi at $154 billion, followed by BAC $121 billion, JPM $100 billion and WFC at $48 billion. „

Tyler Durden in Quantifying The Cost Of FAS 166 And FAS 167: At Least $450 Billion Of Onboarded “Assets” With Citi #1 At $154 Billion | zero hedge

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